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Abstract
This paper examines possible consequences of subsidies to R&D
and to vohune production proposed under the Clinton administration's fiat panel display initiative. We do this in the context of a
model in which firms behave competitively in the short run, while realizing that their choices of capacity and yield-improving R&D in the
medium and long run will affect market price. Policy simulations show
that steady state yields and profits are lower, while prices are higher
with subsidies for capacity acquisition than with R&D subsidies. This
occurs because a firm's incentives to do R&D are diminished by a
subsidy on capacity costs.
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Introduction

In April 1994, the Clinton administration announced a $597 million policy
initiative to encourage U.S. companies to invest in research and development (R&D), as well as large scale production of flat panel displays (FPD).
Semiconductors have become a standard part of many manufactured products and flat panel displays are seen as having a similar potential. In the
near future, however, computers are likely to account for more than half of
F PD demand. Recommended support for the National Flat Panel Display
Initiative included $318 million for core research and development (R&D),
$50 million for a manufacturing test bed, $199 million for R&D linked to
volume production, and $20 million for procurement incentives. Among the
initiative's goals is the creation of a U.S.-based industry capable of achieving
a 15 percent share of the world F PD market by the year 2000 (Flamm 1994).
The initiative has been highly controversial. 1 While the Department of
Defense (DoD) claims domestic production of FPDs is critical for national
security, critics label the initiative as misguided industrial policy. Citing
surveillance experiences from Desert Storm and the growing importance of
digital technologies, DoD officials argue that effective use of advanced information technologies will determine the winners of future military conflicts.
Visual displays are seen as a critical factor in this regard. Moreover, relative
to cathode ray tube displays, FPDs are reliable, lightweight, and energy efficient. Thus, DoD justifies the need for policy by citing limited U.S. capacity
to produce F P Ds and the apparent refusal of Japanese companies to tailor
FPDs to DoD specifications (DoD 1994).
Critics of the initiative argue that U.S. military demand for F P Ds could
be met easily by several small to medium size plants, an increase in capacity much less than that required to capture 15 percent of the world market
(Barfield 1994, 1995; Mently 1994b). DoD estimates of future military demand for F I? Ds are 15,000 annually from 1995 - 1999 and 25,000 annually
from 2000 - 2009 (DoD 1994, page III - 14). Thus, even DoD estimates
place defense needs for F P Ds far below the initiative's goal of 15 percent of
the world market. It is not surprising, then, that the initiative is considered
lSee Barfield 1994 and 1995, Flamm 1994 and 1995, Miller 1995, and Mowery 1995.
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by some to be thinly disguised industrial policy. In addition, it is also argued
that thesize of the initiative is too small for it to make much of a difference.
Viewed as such, a question of interest becomes whether the initiative will
lead to an increase in output, and whether these firms will earn economic
rents. 2 Although this question has not been directly addressed, Mently's
market projections suggest the initiative's output effects, per se, will be small
relative to its goal. He claims a 15 percent market share for U.S. companies
would require an investment of $3 billion, rather than the planned $600
million. Mently's projected rates of return for active matrix liquid crystal
displays also suggest relatively low profit margins beginning in 1995 (Mently
1995).3
Another point of controversy is whether the initiative is consistent with
post-Uruguay Round subsidy codes. Since R&D support under the initiative
is limited to 50 percent of project cost, DoD officials argue it is well within
the 75 percent cap for subsidies for specific industrial research. Critics, such
as Barfield, argue that the incentives for volume production are beyond precompetitive support and that the procurement incentives directly violate the
new GATT codes. There are, however, exceptions to these rules for defense.
In this paper, we consider a related set of issues, namely the impact of
subsidies for core R&D and of subsidies targeted to high volume production.
We do this in the context of a model which we feel captures the importance
of investment in capacity, as well as yield-improving R&D, in the flat panel
industry. In this model, firms with higher yields, ceteris paribus, invest in
more capacity than those with lower yields. This leads to higher capacity
and output for high yield firms. The model has the property that all firms
who remain in the industry ultimately have the same yield, Le. in the steady
state. Thus firms with an initial advantage in terms of yields tend to remain
ahead for a while, after which laggards catch up. However, note this gives
firms with higher initial yields a stream of quasi-rents, which the laggards
do not enjoy. Such characteristics are thought to apply to industries such as
F P Ds and semiconductors.
Relevant industry characteristics are discussed in Section 2, and a simple,
stylized model is presented in Section 3. In Section 4, we examine the fit between the cost structure postulated in the model and data on manufacturing
20f course, an important issue here is whether profit increases and/or spillover effects
are sufficient to increase national welfare.
3Lower profit margins are a result, in part, of increased world capacity with the recent
entry by Korean firms (Pollack 1995).
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costs for color thin film transistor liquid crystal displays (TFT - LC Ds).
Policy simulations are presented in Section 5. We first look at a permanent
25% subsidy on capacity acquisition versus a 25% subsidy on yield improving
R&D. Our results suggest that capacity subsidies have the unfortunate effect
of decreasing incentives for R&D.4 This, in turn, leads the targeted firm to
have lower steady state yields with capacity subsidies than with either R&D
subsidies or in the absence of policy.
We then compare the effects of a one shot fixed expenditure by the government on capacity and R&D subsidies. This gives us an idea of the difference in leverage provided by the two instruments since the subsidies are
specified' as a given dollar amount. We find that this type of subsidy has
a positive impact effect on the net R&D and capacity expenditure by firms
when the subsidy is for R&D, but not when it is a capacity subsidy! In our
model, R&D subsidies tend to provide more leverage than capacity subsidies.
Directions for future work are discussed in Section 6.

2

The Industry

The fiat panel industry provides an interesting case study, quite apart from
the DoD initiative. It is a highly concentrated industry, in which survival
depends on continual investment in both product and process R&D. Much
like other high-technology electronics products, there are a variety of rival
technologies undergoing development. Successful development of one technology does not guarantee profits for long because new technologies and new
generations of old technologies are constantly being developed.
There are a multitude of interesting characteristics of the industry, and
it is impossible to develop one model which captures all of them. Our model
captures the idea that continual innovation is needed to reap profits. If a firm
does not improve its yield, it falls behind. As the yields of its competitors
rise, market price declines, eventually wiping out the lagging firm's profits,
at which point it exits. In focusing on the role of yield-improving innovation,
4Care should be taken in relating the complex and difficult to implement proposals
by the defense department to the simpler policies discussed here. The DoD (1994, page
1-9) states that "selected companies commited to new investments in volume production
facilities for current generation products would be eligible to receive R&D support for
next generation products and manufacturing processes, commensurate with the level of
commitment demonstrated to volume production." This makes the subsidy conditional
on capacity acquisition, so that it can be interpreted as, in part, a capacity subsidy.
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we take several shortcuts. We assume that firms are concerned only with
the current cycle of production, capacity acquisition and R&D. They do
. not look forward to anticipate the impact of their behavior today on future
cycles. We choose to do this because uncertainty about the future is high in
this industry, making standard dynamic approaches ill-suited for modelling
it. In the interest of simplicity, we also neglect other features such as adjustment costs even though they are important in the industry. Capacity
costs are likely to have a high sunk component leading to irreversibilities and
adjustment costs. Adjustment costs of this kind create" hysteresis," so that
history matters. This creates situations where a temporary policy or shock
can have permanent effects by causing what looks like a regime change. 5
We abstract from several other factors, which while important in the
industry, have been studied elsewhere. Thus, including these factors would
add little that is not already well understood. For example, some of the
yield improvement observed in the industry is likely to result from learning
by doing. Models of learning by doing are well studied in the literature.
In a trade context, Baldwin and Krugman (1988) model the semiconductor
industry in this manner. One result from such models is that firms produce
more than they would if they equated marginal revenue and cost since they
take into account the reduction in future costs implied by an additional unit
of current output. In such contexts, capacity subsidies are in effect also R&D
subsidies, making these models ill-suited for answering the kind of questions
we ask. That is, in learning by doing models, stark differences between R&D
and capacity subsidies cannot be detected. We also assume there are no
spillovers in R&D. Such spillovers occur when a yield improvement by one
firm accrues, at least partially, to other firmS. Again, it is well understood,6
that spillovers of this kind reduce the ability to internalize the effects of R&D
and hence tend to reduce the incentive to do R&D.

2.1

FPD Technologies

As shown in Table 1, liquid crystal displays (LCD) are the major type of
display in touay's market, comprising 87 percent of the commercial market.
In these displays, light is emitted when voltage is applied to liquid crystals enclosed between the two sheets of glass (substrates) that make up the
5See, for example, Baldwin and Krugman 1989.
6For an analysis of R&D spillovers in an international trade context, see Jensen and
Thursby (1987).
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display.7 Active matrix LCDs (AMLCDs), which control the polarization
of these crystals by use of silicon transistors, are considered· the dominant
technology for high information displays. The primary use of AMLCDs is
color screens for laptop computers. Passive matrix LCDs (PM LCD) control light emission by use of metal horizontal and vertical electrodes on the
two sheets of glass. PMLCDs are more commonly used than AMLCDs,
but they have slower response times and tend to be less bright (DoD 1994).
Hence, as noted in the table, DoD predicts an increase in the importance of
AMLCDs, relative to PM LCDs.
One problem with LCDs is that even with redundant transistors at each
pixel, some pixels fail to operate with resulting quality problems in the display. LCDs are produced under the same clean room conditions as semiconductors, and displays which contain defective pixels risk being discarded.
This means quality control problems increase dramatically as the screen size
increases, so that the potential of LCDs for large screen applications is limited. Moreover, LCD producers engage in R&D to develop new generations
of equipment which are capable of producing higher yields, i.e., portion of
production which is of acceptable in terms of defective pixels.
Three alternatives to LCDs are plasma displays (PDP), electroluminescent displays (E LD s), and field emission displays (FED). These displays
differ from LCDs in that they produce their own light. PDPs generate light
by applying voltage to an inert gas enclosed between the two sheets of glass,
while ELDs and F EDs stimulate phosphors to emit light. Notice these
displays comprised only 5 percent of the market in 1993, and DoD's 1994
report predicted emissive displays will remain a small part of the commercial
market in 2000. However, in August 1995, a number of companies announced
progress toward development and production of PDPs and FEDs (Business
Week 1995, Patton and Rawsthorn 1995). Fujitsu, Matsushita, Sony, and
NEC unveiled working prototypes of large screen PDPs (up to 42 inches),
and Fujitsu announced plans to produce 10, 000 units a month by October
1996. PDPs are considered to have the greatest potential for low cost, large
TV screens. 8
7See DoD (i994), Chapter II for a detailed description of each of the FPD technologies.
8Notice in Table 1, the primary application of FPDs has been computers, with the
consumer market representing only 12 percent of demand. While DoD predicts a small
consumer market in 2000, the evolution of cheaper large scale FPDs is likely to dramatically
increase the consumer market.
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2.2

Market Shares in FPDs

As with VCRs, the technologies leading to FPDs were developed in the
labs of U.S. electronics companies, but the industry is now dominated by
Japanese companies. 9 For example, early technologies for F P D s were developed. in research labs at RCA, Westinghouse, and IBM in the 1960s
and 1970s. Engineers in RCA's Sarnoff Lab developed LCD technology
with the goal of developing a TV screen "fiat enough to hang on a wall"
(DoD 1994, Ch.V I). Dr. Peter Brody, of Westinghouse, developed the
cadmium selenide AMLC D technology underlying the majority of today's
AMLCDs. Although these technologies were at the prototype stage, neither
RCA nor Westinghouse pursued commercial development of F P Ds. RC A
switched from LCD to cathode ray research in the 1970s, while Westinghouse
dropped its project in 1979. In the 1970s, IBM pursued plasma technologies
for computers and business applications, but in 1984 it switched R&D efforts
to LCD technologies. In the late 1980s, IBM and Toshiba formed Display
Technologies, Inc. (DTI) , a joint venture for development and high volUme production of LCDs in Japan. None of these companies invested in
manufacturing capacity in the United States. 10
In contrast, companies such as Sharp and NEC actively pursued development and production of F P Ds. Both companies stood to benefit from
their experience with the types of clean room conditions and continual process improvements important in semiconductors. Sharp successfully applied
F P D technology to hand-held calculators in the 1970s, and in the 1980s it
became a leader in color thin-film transistor LCDs (TFT - LCD). In 1993,
Sharp was the world's largest producer of F P Ds, with its sales comprising 44
percent of the world market. NEC and DTI were the next largest producers,
with sales comprising 35 percent of the market (DoD1994, Ch.IV).
9The patent underlying virtually all VCR technologies was obtained by Ampex Corporation, a U.S. company, in the late 1950s. Although Ampex successfully commercialized
a video tape recorder for broadcast use, the first companies to commercialize a consumer
product were Sony, JVC, and Matsushita. This occurred despite early efforts by RCA
to develop a consumer videorecorder and a joint-venture by Ampex and Toshiba for the
same purpose.' See Tyson (1992) for an analysis which focuses on the role of government
policy in VCR development. In contrast, Rosenbloom and Cusumano (1987) take the view
that the evolution of the industry is due primarily to different management styles of the
companies involved.
lOSee Ch. VI of the 1994 DoD report for an account of other efforts by U.S., European,
and Japanese companies.
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In total, approximately 50 companies manufacture F P Ds. As noted in
Table 2, Japanese companies accounted for over 90 percent of the LCD
market in 1993. Seven Japanese companies accounted for 98 percent of the
AMLCD market. In 1993, the only volume producer of AMLCDs in the
United States was Optical Imaging Systems, which primarily sold displays for
avionics applications. If one views IBM's joint venture, DTI, as a Japanese
company, the only markets in which U.S. companies are large players are the
PDP and ELD markets. The faCt that these markets comprise only 5 percent of the total value of LCDs (Table 1) is one aspect of DoD's justification
for the flat panel policy initiative.
Several U.S. companies are conducting R&D on FPDs, in part, as a
response to the DoD initiative. Optical Imaging Systems was awarded an
Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) contract to construct a new
AMLCD plant, and it is involved in a joint venture with Apple to develop
displays for computer applications. Additionally, a consortium formed by
AT&T, Standish Industries, and Xerox received a DoD award to develop a
manufacturing test bed. Various other R&D projects are ongoing at Motorola, Raytheon, Sarnoff Labs, and Texas Instruments.

3

A Simple Model

In this section, we develop a simple model which we feel captures several
important features of the flat panel display industry. First, we feel the timing
structure needs to recognize that output is easier to change than capacity,
which in turn is easier to change than yield. We therefore assume that in
what we call the short run, both capacity and yield are fixed. In what we
call the medium run, capacity is variable, and in the long run, yield can be
chosen. Of course, in the steady state of such a model, long run and short
run yields must be equal.
Second, we feel that in the short run, with capacity and yield as given,
firms behave competitively and take price as given. Thus, their only decision
is whether to produce to capacity or not. l l If profits are nonnegative, firms
produce; and, if profits are negative, firms do not produce. However, in the
llThe clever reader will immediately think of a counterexample where the last firm's
capacity, if used entirely, results in negative profits, but, if not used at all, results in a.
price higher than short run marginal cost. It is argued below that this case will never
arise. The argument consists of showing that capacity choices of this kind are never made.
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medium run, they choose capacity. In making this decision, they take into
account the fact that capacity affects output and hence profit. This results
in a capacity choice equilibrium resembling a Cournot Nash equilibrium. In
the long run, firms choose R&D expenditure which affects their yields, and
hence their capacity choice, as well as output. Notice that we abstract from
R&D to develop new types of F P Ds, so that the only R&D is for process
improvement.
Third, firms with a high yield find it easier to attain a given yield higher
than their existing one than do firms with lower yields. However, any improvement in yields is costly. It is also assumed that there are positive costs
of any improvement in yields, no matter how infinitesimal. The latter assumption permits convergence of the yields to a finite level in some steady
states.
We wish to use the model to answer questions about the evolution of
industry capacity. If, for example, a given number of firms start off with
different yields, what should we expect for their capacity and yield paths
over time? Do firms that have better yields invest more or less in R&D?
Do firms with better yields stay ahead in terms of yields? If there is entry
into the industry, will profits be eroded to zero? Does the final profile of an
industry depend on the initial profile? How?
By examining these questions, we hope to shed light on the effect of policies designed to encourage investment in R&D and in production facilities.
We find that firms with higher yields, ceteris paribus, invest in more capacity
than those with lower yields. Since firms produce up to capacity, this implies
more output by these firms. Higher outputs, in turn, increase the benefits
from investments in R&D to raise yields. As our simulation results show,
this conflagration of forces plays a role in the effects of capacity and R&D
subsidies. While capacity subsidies initially lead to increased capacity, and
hence investment in yields, at the margin they reduce the benefit from yieldincreasing R&D. As shown in Section 4, this can lead to steady state yields
which are lower than what would occur without the capacity subsidies. In
contrast, subsidies to R&D promote higher steady state yields.

3.1

The Short Run

Assume that there are N firms in the industry. Each firm i has a capacity
of Si , and a yield of yi . The production process can be thought of as being
composed of two steps. In order to have one viable unit of production at
9

the end of the first stage, l/yi units need to be started at a unit cost of Cl
per unit started. This corresponds to the idea that only yi percent of the
F P Ds are usable since panels have to be discarded if any pixels are defective.
Following this, further stages of production must be performed on the viable
unit at a cost of C2 per unit. Thus the total cost of qi units of produced
output in the short run for a firm with yield yi and capacity Si is

(~~ + C2) qi
00

Such firms have a marginal cost of ,

far qi

~S

(1)

far qi > Si

+ C2

•

Profits are thus

The supply curve for the industry is as depicted in Figure 1. As firms
behave competitively, each firm supplies its entire capacity if price exceeds its
marginal cost. This permits us to replace qi with Si whenever a firm makes
positive profits. It also results in the step function form of supply depicted.
Firms take the intersection of demand and supply as the given price, and they
maximize their profits accordingly in the short run. As drawn, firms with
lower indices have higher yields and correspondingly lower marginal costs.
Only firms with indices less than k + 1 supply as drawn in Figure 1.

3.2

The MediUIn Run

In the short run, firms take their capacities as given, as well as their yields.
In the medium run, they take only their yields as given, and they choose
capacities. The cost of an additional unit of capacity is F i , but a firm which
has a yield of yi will incur a cost of (Fi jyi) qi to get an output of qi. Of
course, they realize that their choice of capacity affects the price in the market
and incorporate such considerations in their decision making. Each firm,
therefore, chooses its capacity, Si, to maximize its medium run profits, which
along with its first order condition are given below.
10

a~r (yi,

Si, S-i)
aSi

(4)

Fi
yi = 0
Figure 2 depicts the capacity choice which solves (4). Note that if a firm
chooses to invest in capacity, its profits in the short run must be strictly
positive.12 Hence, firms will choose to produce all their capacity in the short
run.
As all firms choose their capacities in this manner, the solution to this
system looks like a Cournot Nash equilibrium. The equilibrium levels of Si
are denoted by Si (yl , y2, ... , yN) for i = 1, ... , N. Notice that firms wi th higher
yields will choose higher capacity levels as one would expect.

3.3

The Long Run

In the long run, firms choose their yield levels realizing how this affects the
outcome in the short and medium runs. The cost to a firm with yield Yb of
raising its yield to level yi is denoted by Ri(Yb, yi). We will assume that this
takes a particular functional form given by

Ri(y~, yi) = z (yi _ y~)

+ B(yi _ y~)2.

(5)

Note this functional form has the property that even small improvements
in yield are costly and that larger improvements become progressively more
costly.
Thus, firm i in the long run wishes to maximize its long run profits given
by:
12If P (2:7=1 Sj) - ~ - C2 = 0, then the lowest yield firm may produce less than its full
capacity. It is easily shown that the medium run equilibrium rules out capacity choices
that will not be used in the short run.
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IIjr (yi , 8'(0) , S-i(o)) -

p

(t

-

~SiO -

S;

(oJ) 8'(-) - (~: + "') 8'(-)
Z(yi -

y~) -

B(yi -

(6)

y~f.

The first order condition, after using the envelope theorem, gives:

In addition to the long run first order condition given above, we need a
steady state condition for each firm. In the steady state, the yield chosen
by each. firm must equal its initial yield. The steady state condition for each
firm, therefore, consists of Equation (7) where R'(·) is evaluated at yi = y~.

4

Costs and Yields

In this section, we examine data for costs of production at various yields to
get an idea of the importance of yield differences in the industry. Cost data
are from Stanford Resources, Inc. (Mently and Castellano 1994; Stanford
Resources, Inc.1994). They refer to a portion of the AMLCD market, namely
color TFT-LCDsproduced in 1994.
In the short run, recall that each firm produces up to capacity, as long as
its short run costs fall short of price, with costs given by(, + C2) Si if their
yield is yi. Mently and Castellano report unit costs for final output levels
(qi) between 60,000 and 960,000 panels per year and yields between .1 and
.9. These unit cost data include variable costs such as materials, supplies,
and equipment, as well as direct and indirect labor, employed in producing
color T FT-LCDs .. They also include capital investment cost in the form
of depreciati.on. 13 Based on these data (net of depreciation), the following
regression was estimated to give us estimates of Cl and C2:
13Mently and Castellano report high and low cost figures for unit costs and depreciation.
The regressions reported here are based on their high cost figures. Regression results
using low costs are similar to those reported here and are available from the authors.
For procedures used to compute the unit cost data, see Mently and Castellano. Their
depreciation figures are based on straight line depreciation over five years.
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£fi
T l.I

=

-

i

q
yZ

Cl --:'

- i +E.
+ C2Q

(8)

Coefficient estimates and standard errors are reported in Table 3. The form
seems to fit the data well with an R 2 of .93.
Note that a two stage cost structure is embodied in this cost function. A
fraction y of the starts are non defective at the end of the first stage. The
cost of the first stage application is Cl' Thus, to get one unit past the first
stage, l/y units are needed as starts with a cost of cdy per non defective
unit at the end of the first stage. At the second stage, the cost is C2 per unit
that goes in. Our estimates suggest that variable cost levels rise sharply with
reductions in yield, especially at low yield levels.
Our s0ecification of medium run costs also depends on yields. That is,
TC:nr = ft
+ C2~ Si - ~y Si, where the last term reflects capacity acquisition
y
cost. As noted a ove, Stanford Resources also reports data for capacity cost
in the form of depreciation. Since these data are reported for final output
levels between 60, 000 and 960, 000 panels per year and yields between .1
and .9, we can examine the importance of yields in medium run cost. We
estimate a regression of the form

. _Si
TF()'t = F-.

yZ

+ E.

(9)

As noted in Table 3, our estimate of F is 51.82, and the R2 is .99. 14 Depreciation on flow capacity costs and hence plant costs thus also depend on
yield.
Taking both estimates into account, it appears that plants with yields
of 30% or more are viable at 1994 prices. That is, with a yield of 30%,
variable costs are about $710 per unit and capacity costs are approximately
$170, while the December 1994 price was around $1000. With a 20% yield,
variable costs are about $790 per unit, and capacity costs are about $260 per
unit. In our model, a firm with this yield would show negative medium run
profits at the 1994 price.
14S uch a high R2 makes us suspect the capacity cost data, in particular, come from
accounting procedures which replicate our model.

13

5

Simulation Results

In this Section, we focus on policy experiments in a simple two firm version
of our model. We do this for several reasons. First, while the cost equations
in our model show a good fit with the data, other data and/or elasticity
esti:r:nates needed to calibrate the model are not publicly available. Second,
the model's equilibrium conditions, especially those for long run equilibrium
given by (6) and (7), are highly non linear. This makes it difficult to solve
the system analytically with many asymmetric firms. We therefore simulate
a simple two firm system to obtain some insights into policy issues.
We focus on two policy experiments. In the first, we look at the effects
of a 25% permanent subsidy to R&D or to capacity acquisition. In the
second, we look at the effect of a given one time subsidy on either R&D or
on capacity. In both experiments, we show how the results depend on the
degree of asymmetry between the firms.
The model is the same as in the previous sections. For simplicity, we
assume a linear form for the market demand curve, which is parameterized
as

p

(t

5i )

=a-

;=1

b

(t

5i ) .

(10)

;=1

Short run profits are given by (2), medium run profits by (3) and long run
profits by (6). In each of the simulations we look at the evolution towards
the steady state of key endogenous variables, including yields, capacity, price,
and profits. Our purpose in carrying out these simulations is to help understand the possible consequences of proposed subsidies to R&D and to volume
production in the flat panel industry. Will subsidies to capacity acquisition
help or hinder the long run competitiveness of the targeted firm? Are such
subsidies likely to raise or reduce welfare?

5.1

A 25% Subsidy

We first consider the case of two identical firms. We trace the behavior of
the simulated market over time under three scenarios. The first is that of no
policy. The second is that of a 25% subsidy on capacity for one firm, call it
firm A, so that F is reduced by 25% for firm A alone. The third is that of
a 25% subsidy on R&D expenditure which corresponds to a 25% reduction
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in z and for firm A . We then repeat the above three simulations for the
asymmetric case where firm A has a lower yield than firm B. This allows us
to examine the effects of an initial disadvantage on the results of the policy
experiments.
In each case, the parameters we use are as follows. The slope of the
inverse demand curve, b, and its intercept, a , are set at b = 1 and a = 37.
The marginal costs in the short run are given by (-q. + C2) for firm i = A, B
. We set Cl = C2 = 1. Inthe symmetric case both fums have the same yield
of .5 so that yA = yS = .5 . In the asymmetric case yA = .4 and yS = .5 .
The cost of obtaining a unit of capacity is F and is common to both firms.
We set F = 2 throughout. The cost parameters in yield increasing R&D are
and these are common to both firms and set at z = 120 and =
z and
1000 .

e,

5.1.1

e

The Symmetric Case

In the symmetric case, given yields of .5 each, both firms choose a capacity of
10. The market price to start with is 17, short run marginal cost of each firm
is 3, and short run profits are 140 each. Capacity costs are 40 per unit and
medium run profits are 100. We run the system through 30 iterations. At
each iteration, yields rise, capacity rises, profits rise, and price falls. Yields
rise to .583, which is close to the steady state level of .586. Capacity rises
to 10.28, while price falls to 16.43. On the other hand, expenditure on yieldimproving R&D falls dramatically to .06 from a starting value of 2.12.
When we reduce the cost of capacity acquisition by 25% to firm A the
immediate response in the first iteration is an increase in the chosen capacity
to 10.67. In response to this, B's capacity choice is to keep capacity slightly
below 10. In addition, A invests less in yield-improving R&D than before
and has a lower yield as a consequence! While B invests more than A, its
investment in R&D also falls from that with no policy in response to A's
reduction in R&D. Initially A invests 1.12 and B invests 1.85. Both of these
numbers are below those which would occur in the absence of policy.
The impact effect of the subsidy is to raise A's gross profits and lower B's.
Over time, A's profits rise but then begin to fall while B's rise throughout.
The reason for this is that a capacity subsidy (which reduces F ) encourages
capacity investment as is evident from (4). However~ incentives to do R&D
are also diminished by the subsidy on capacity costs. The reason is apparent
from the first order condition given in (7). This equation can be thought of as
15

choosing Yi on the part of firm. i to equate the marginal benefit of yield im-

Proving R&D,

Si (.) + (y»2
(--fL...
poi Si(.) + P'(·)Si(.)
(y»2

"aSj(Yl!~

6:.

ay>

..!yn))

,

with its

Jr'

marginal cost, R' (.). If the problem is well behaved we can think of the
marginal benefit as decreasing in yi. The marginal cost is increasing in yi for
our specification, starting from any given initial yield. Recall that a capacity
subsidy reduces F by 25%. This shifts the marginal benefit curve of doing
yield reducing R&D inwards, reducing the chosen yield.
In contrast, a subsidy to R&D reduces R' (.)by 25% in (7). This shifts the
marginal cost of yield reducing R&D down and out, raising the chosen level
of yi. This in turn reduces the marginal cost of a unit of capacity as seen in
(4) and this raises capacity acquisition in the medium run.
At the end of 30 iterations, A has a yield of .544, while B has a yield of
.579, both of which are less than that without policy! A's capacity exceeds
that of B (10.68 versus 10.08), and price falls to 16.25. R&D expenditure
falls to .002 for A and .013 for B, both of which are lower than they would
be without the policy. Profits in the short run initially go to 142.6 for firm A
and 133.8 for firm. B as a direct consequence of the higher capacity induced
by the subsidy. After 30 iterations, short run profits go to 143.2 and 136.2,
respectively.
In contrast, an R&D subsidy of 25% results in an impact effect which
almost doubles A 's R&D expenditure, which goes to 4.07 while B's goes to
2.06. Both firms' R&D expenditures fall steadily over time to .03 and .005
respectively after 30 iterations. Firm. A 's capacity rises steadily over time to
10.8, while B's stays at about 10. Yields also rise steadily to .692 and .576 for
A and B, respectively. A 's short run profits rise throughout while B's fall
throughout ending up at 148.7 and 134.2, respectively, after 30 iterations.
Price falls to 16.15 at the end of 30 iterations.
It is perhaps easiest to compare the effects of the three policies on yields
by looking at Figure 3. Each point is an iterative value of yields for A and B.
Yields are always increasing, In the first iterations, there are large changes
in yields, but these get smaller over time, as depicted by the dots moving
closer together as yields rise. The R curve, which gives the yields with the
R&D subsidy, always lies to the right of the N curve, which depicts the yield
with no policy. The C curve always lies to the left of the N curve. Thus,
while Breaches rougWy the same yield across the three scenarios, A's yields
vary considerably, being lowest in the capacity subsidy case and highest in
16

the R&D subsidy case. Figures 4 and 5 depict the capacity and short run
profit paths as a function of time for the two firms across the three scenarios.

5.1.2

The Asymmetric Case

While the simulations above provide useful insights, it is important to ask
about the extent to which they are modified by firm A being at an initial
disadvantage. To cast some light on this, we repeated our simulations for
starting values of yields of.4 for A and .5 for B. Without any policy, A's initial
disadvantage is slowly overcome. A invests significantly more in R&D than
B and the two firms arrive at the symmetric steady state as before. When
a capacity subsidy of 25% is given, the same kind of effects are obtained as
in the symmetric case. A's investment in R&D, while remaining above B's,
falls due to the subsidy. However, even after 30 iterations, the yield of firm
A remains below that of firm B, .543 versus .579! In contrast, with an R&D
subsidy, A's yields surpass those of B after only 7 iterations. By the end of
30 iterations, the yields are at .691 and .576, respectively.
Thus, asymmetries in the initial yields only seem to magnify the differences in the two policies. With initial asymmetries, firm A needs to invest
heavily in R&D to catch up with firm B. A capacity subsidy reduces the incentive to do R&D, and as a result, A's yield remains below B's. By contrast,
an R&D subsidy enhances the incentives to do R&D; and, A's yield, short
run profits,· and capacity overtake B's in a small number of periods. The
behavior of yields in the asymmetric case are depicted in Figure 6. Again,
each point is an iterative value of yields for A and B. Yields are always increasing, and at first, there are large changes in yield, but these get smaller
over time, as depicted by the dots moving closer together as yields rise. The
R curve, which gives yields with the R&D subsidy, always lies to the right of
the N curve, which depicts the yield with no policy. The C curve always lies
to the left of the N curve. Again, while B reaches roughly the same yield
across the three scenarios, A's yields vary considerably, being lowest in the
capacity subsidy scenario and highest in the R&D subsidy scenario. Figures
7 and 8 depict the capacity and short run profit paths as a function of time
for the two firms across the three scenarios in the asymmetric case.
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5.2

A Given Subsidy Expenditure

The results so far suggest that R&D subsidies seem to be more effective than
capacity subsidies. The reason is that a R&D subsidy raises yields, which in
turn effectively reduces the cost of a unit of capacity, and encourages capacity
acquisition, while a subsidy on capacity raises the incentive to do capacity
acquisition, but reduces the incentive to do yield improving R&D.
The simulations so far compare a given permanent (25%) subsidy on
R&D versus one on capacity. They do not compare the effects of a given,
one shot expenditure on the two kinds of subsidies, which is, of course, the
relevant comparison for the allocation of given funds to alternative policies.
Such a simulation would also address another criticism of the DoD initiative:
namely that it is too small to produce the desired effect. It is obvious that a
dollar spent on R&D or capacity subsidies need not result in exactly a dollar
increase in gross expenditure. It could result in more than a dollar increase in
gross expenditure, so that net expenditure (expenditure net of the subsidy)
rises, or it could result in less than a dollar increase in gross expenditure, so
that net expenditure falls!
First note that in our earlier simulations, yields and capacity stabilize
as the steady state is reached, so that R&D and capacity expenditures fall
over time. If we simulate the effects of a one time subsidy, the impact or
immediate effect will be to raise the gross level of the targeted variable above
its no policy path, but when the subsidy is removed in the next period, these
.higher levels can not be sustained. In the model we use, there is no effect
of a one shot policy on the steady state. However, this does not mean that
these policies have no effect: the path to steady state is very different under
the t~o policies.
Figure 9 plots the net effect of a $1 subsidy (applied as the equivalent advalorem level) when applied to R&D and to capacity in the symmetric case.
The dashed line in the figure plots the difference between the targeted firm's
R&D expenditure (net of the government subsidy) when it receives a oneshot dollar subsidy for R&D and its R&D expenditure without policy. The
cross-hatched line plots the difference in the firm's capacity expenditure (net
of the subsidy) with and without this R&D subsidy. The solid and dotted
lines have the same interpretations when the policy is a one-shot subsidy for
capacity acquisition. We focus on these plots since the path of yields and
capacity can be inferred from them.
A dollar spent on R&D results in an immediate increase in gross expen-
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diture on R&D of about 2.62 dollars, so that net expenditure rises by about
1.62 dollars as shown in Figure 9. Of course, in the following period, expenditure on R&D falls below that with no policy. However, this reduction is
only about .4, so that the impact effect dominates. This results in the path
of yields lying above the no policy path. Moreover, the impact effect of the
R&D subsidy on capacity expenditure is to raise it above its no policy path
as shown in Figure 9. This is because, as discussed earlier, higher yields
reduce the cost of investing in capacity and so result in a greater incentive
to invest in capacity. Thus, capacity also lies above its no policy path in this
case.
In contrast, a dollar spent on a capacity subsidy results in an impact effect
of a net reduction in expenditure on capacity acquisition of about -.76! In
other words, gross expenditure rises by only .24 as there is crowding out of
private expenditure by the government subsidy. In addition, expenditure on
R&D falls as a capacity subsidy reduces the incentive to invest in R&D as
argued earlier. In subsequent periods there is a small positive effect on R&D
and capacity expenditures relative to the no policy path which fades out over
time with the capacity expenditure becoming negative in some later periods.
Figure 10 plots the net effect of a $1 subsidy (applied as 'the equivalent
ad-valorem level) when applied to R&D and to capacity in the asymmetric
case with firm A's yield reduced from .5 to .3. The four curves have the same
interpretation as in Figure 9. 15 First, note that a dollar spent on R&D results
in an immediate increase in gross expenditure on R&D of only 1.68 dollars,
so that net expenditure rises by about .68 dollars, as shown by the dashed
line in the figure. To understand this, recall that with asymmetric firms, if
the laggard (firm A ) does not drop out, it spends more on R&D than the
firm which is ahead in order to catch up. With a convex R&D cost function,
the more R&D that is done, the more expensive is further R&D. This, plus
the fact that steady states are independent of initial conditions as long as the
firms remain in the market, make a given dollar subsidy on R&D translate
into a smaller equivalent percentage in the asymmetric case (as compared
to the symmetric one). While both factors reduce the effectiveness of R&D
subsidies in "the asymmetric case, the qualitative conclusions drawn in the
symmetric case remain. As before, capacity acquisition is encouraged by the
R&D subsidy, and in subsequent periods R&D expenditure falls below that
with no subsidy at all.
15The intermediate case where firm A's yield is .4 shows effects similar to these.
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A capacity subsidy of a dollar initially reduces and then raises R&D
expenditure. Net expenditure on capacity falls by about .61 as the gross
expenditure rises by only .39. In contrast to the symmetric case, however,
expenditure on capacity does not rise above the no policy level in subsequent
periods. These simulations thus suggest that R&D subsidies dominate capacity subsidies if the aim is to raise yields and capacity. They also suggest
that R&D subsidies have greater leverage in the symmetric case as they have
a larger net impact effect under these circumstances.

6

Concluding Remarks

The public debate on fiat panels has focused largely on whether the Clinton administration initiative is clever promotion of dual use technology or
straightforward industrial policy. In contrast, we examine whether subsidies
to promote volume production ($199 million of the initiative) or R&D subsidies ($318 million of the initiative) are more effective. Our results suggest
that R&D subsidies provide the government more leverage in supporting an
industry. In the context of our model, subsidies for capacity can, in fact,
backfire because they reduce a firm's incentive to invest in yield-improving
R&D. As always, these results should be interpreted in the context of the
model and its exclusions. For example, the inclusion of learning by doing
would make our distinction between R&D and capacity subsidies less clear.
Perhaps the most interesting revision would be to see how the inclusion of
forward looking behavior by firms would effect our results with and without
policy.
Our model can be used to examine other issues, such as the effects of entry.
The effect of entry is important for the fiat panel industry, not only with
respect to entry of U.S. firms, but also with respect to recently announced
capacity increases of Korean firms (Pollack 1995). It is entirely possible that
profits are not eroded to zero by entry because entrants use technologies
with lower yields than incumbent firms who have done the necessary R&D
to maintain higher yields. 16
An additional issue of interest is how the initial configuration of firms'
16Hence, new firms have disincentives for entry. Incumbent firms realize that raising
capacity will reduce price and this results in their voluntarily limiting their capacity.
Thus, it is likely that despite firms choosing output competitively, profits are non zero due
to quasi rents that arise.
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capacities and yields determines final industry configuration. Indeed, we
suspect that firms which enter early can remain and earn profits later on
when new entry is not viable! These issues, as well the effect of R&D or
capacity subsidies on the final configuration of firms and the minimum size
of subsidies necessary to accomplish particular goals, are left for future work.

21

7

References

Baldwin, Richard and Paul Krugman. 1988. Market access and international
competition: a simulation study of 16K random access memory. In Robert
Feenstra, ed. Empirical Methods for International Trade. Cambridge: MIT
Press.
____. 1989. Persistent trade effects of large exchange rate shocks.
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 104: 635-654.
Barfield, Claude E. 1995. Flat-panel initiative: A bad idea. Issues in
Science and Technology (Spring):9-12.
Barfield, Claude E. 1994. Flat panel displays: A second look. Issues in
Science and Technology (Winter):21-25.
Davis, Bob. 1995. Clinton's key technology-policy effort is dealt a blow
by Congressional study. The Wall Street Journal (Wednesday, May 3):A2,
A6.
Edmondson, Gail and Neil Gross. 1995. The grand alliance in fiat panels.
Business Week (August 28):73.
Flamm, Kenneth S. 1995. In defense of the fiat-panel display initiative.
Issues In Science and Technology (Spring):22-25.
Flamm, Kenneth S. 1994. Flat-panel displays: Catalyzing a U.S. industry. Issues in Science and Technology (FaU):28-32.
Hamilton, David P. 1995. An idea: Replace light bulbs with LEDs. The
Wall Street Journal (May 10):Bl.
Jensen, Richard and Marie Thursby. 1987. A decision theoretic model of
innovation, technology transfer, and trade. The Review of Economic Studies
(LIV): 631-647..
MacKnight, Susan. 1994. Flat panel displays: Redefining the parameters
of U.S. government support for industry? Japan Economic Institute Report
No. 29A. Washington, D.C.: Japan Economic Institute.
Mentley, .David E. 1995. Financial analysis of the TFT industry. In International Display Report (June 13). Mountain View, CA: SEMI Newsletter
Service.
Mentley, David E. 1994a. Forecast inflation. In International Display
Report [November 15]. Mountain View, CA: SEMI Newsletter Service.

22

Mentley, David E. 1994b. Flat panel displays for military airplanes. In
International Display Report (July 15). Mountain View, CA: SEMI Newsletter Service.
Mentley, David E., and J. A. Castellano. 1994. Flat panel display manufacturing cost: A comparative analysis. 2nd edition. San Jose, CA: Stanford
Resources, Inc.
Miller, Debra L. 1995. Forum: Flat-panel displays. Issues in Science and
Technology: 8
¥owery, David C. 1995. Forum: Flat-panel displays. Issues in Science
and Technology: 8.
Nakamoto, Michiyo, and Alice Rawsthorn. 1995. Japanese race to develop wall-hung plasma TVs. Financial Times (Friday, August 25):3. .
Patton, Robert, and Alice Rawsthorn. 1995. A wall-hanging wonder.
Financial Times (Friday, September 1) :8.
Pollack, Andrew. 1995. Japanese face glut of computer screens. The New
York Times (May 29):A39.
Rosenbloom, Richard S., and Michael A. Cusumano. 1987. Technological pioneering and competitive advantage: The birth of the VCR industry.
California Management Review 29 (4):51-76.
Schott, Jeffery J. 1994. The Uruguay round: An assessment. Washington,
D.C.: Center for International Economics.
Stanford Resources, Inc. 1994. World average selling prices TFT-LCDs
used in portable computers [chart]. In The proceedings of the 11th annual
flat information display conference and exhibition. San Jose, CA: Stanford
Resources, Inc.
Tyson, Laura D'Andrea. 1992. Managing trade and investment: Europe's evolving strategy in the electronics industry. In Trade conflict in
high-technology industries. Washington, D.C.: Center for International Economics.
U.S. Department of Defense. 1994. Building U.S. capabilities in fiat panel
displays. Final report. DOD.

23

PURDUE CIBER - 1993 WORKING PAPERS

No. 93-101

Gordon M. Phillips, Robert J. Weiner
"Information and Normal Backwardation as Determinants of Trading Performance: Evidencefrom the
North-Sea Oil Forward Market." 1994. The Economic Journal.

No. 93-102

Stephen R. Goldberg, Frank L. Heflin
"The Association Between the Level of International Diversification and Risk. "

No. 93-103

John A. Carlson
"Risk A version, Foreign Exchange Speculation and Gambler's Ruin. "

No. 93-104

John A. Carlson, Aasim M. Husain, Jeffrey A. Zimmerman
"PenaLties and Exclusion in the Rescheduling and Forgiveness of International Loans. "

No. 93-105

Kent D. Miller
"Industry and Country Effects on Manager's Perceptions of EnvironmentaL Uncertainties. "
1993. Journal of International Business Studies, 24: 693-714.

No. 93·106

Stephen R. Goldberg and Joseph H. Godwin
"Foreign Currency Translation Under Two Cases-Integrated and Isolated Economies. "

No. 93-107

Kent D. Miller
"A Comparison of Managers' Uncertainty Perceptions and Country Risk Indices. "

No. 93-108

Jon D. Haveman
"The Effect of Trade Induced Displacement on Unemployment and Wages. "

No. 93-109

Jon D. Haveman
"Some Welfare Effects ofDynamic Customs Union Formation. "

No. 93·110

John A. Carlson, Insook Kim
"CentraL Banks' Expected Profits From Intervention. "

If you would Like to request copies of specific papers, pLease contact the Center for International Business Education and
Research, Purdue University, Krannert School of Management, West Lafayette, IN 47907.
(Phone: 317/494-4463 or FAX: 317/494·9658)

PURDUE CIBER - 1994 WORKING PAPERS

No. 94-001

Casper G. De Vries, Phillip A. Stork, Kees G. Koedijk
"Between Realignments and Intervention: The Belgian Franc in the European Monetary System. "

No. 94-002

Casper G. de Vries, K. U. Leuven
"Stylized Facts of Nominal Exchange Rate Returns."

No. 94-003

Kent D. Miller
"Operational Flexibility Responses to Environmental Uncertainties. "

No. 94-004

Kent D. Miller
"Economic Exposure and Integrated Risk Management. "

No. 94-005

Kent D. Miller
"Diversification Responses to Environmental Uncertainties. "

No. 94-006

John M. Hannon, lng-Chung Huang, Bih-Shiaw Jaw
"International Human Resource Strategy and Its Determinants: The Case of Multinationals and Their
Subsidiaries in Taiwan."

No. 94-007

John M. Hannon, lng-Chung Huang, Bih-Shiaw Jaw
"International Human Resource Strategy and Control: The Case of Multinationals and Their
Subsidiaries. "

No. 94-008

John M. Hannon, Yoko Sano
"Customer-Driven Human Resource Policies and Practices in Japan. "

No. 94-009

John A. Carlson, Insook Kim
"Leaning Against the Wind: Do Central Banks Necessarily Lose?"

No. 94-010

John A. Carlson, David W. Schodt
"Beyond the Lecture: Case Teaching and the Learning of Economic Theory."

No. 94-011

Alok R. Chaturvedi, Hemant K. Jain, Derek L. Nazareth
"Key Information Systems Management Issues in Developing Countries: Differences in the Indian and
US Contexts. "

No. 94-012

Jon Haveman,
"The Influence of Changing Trade Patterns on Displacements of Labor."

No. 94-013

Stephen Goldberg, Charles A. Tritschler, Joseph H. Godwin
"Financial Reporting for Foreign Exchange Derivatives."

No. 94-014

Charles Noussair, Charles Plott, Raymond Riezman
"Una investigacion experimental sobre la estructura del comercia interncional (Spanish Version)."
Translated: "An Experimental Investigation About the Structure of International Commerce."

No. 94-015

Marie Thursby, Richard Jensen
"Patent Races, Product Standards, and International Competition. "

No. 94-016

Kent D. Miller, Jeffrey J. Reuer
"Firm Strategy and Economic Exposure to Foreign Exchange Rate Movements."

No. 94-017

John Hannon, Yoko Sano
"The Determinants of Corporate Attractiveness in Japan."

No. 94-018

John Hannon, lng-Chung Huang, Cheng-Chen Lin
"The Mediating E./fect of Pre/Post Assignment Acitivities on the Quality of Work Life of Expatriates:
Evidence for Managers in the P.R.C."

No. 94-019

John Hannon, lng-Chung Huang, Cheng-Chen Lin
"The Mediating E.tfects of Organization Commitment and Job Involvement on the Relationship Between
Quality of Work L!fe and Customer Service Attitudes."

No. 94-020

John A. Carlson, Marc Surchat
"A Modelfor Filter-Rule Gains in Foreign Exchange Markets."

No. 94-021

Ch.N. Noussair, Ch.R. Plott, R. Riezman
"The Principles (~l Exchange Rate Determination in an International Finance Lxperiment."

No. 94·()22

Stephen R. Goldberg, Joseph H. Godwin, Myung-Sun Kim, Charles A. Tritschler
"On The Determinants of Corporate Hedging With Financial Derivatives."

IIyou would like to request copies (~lspecific papers, please contact the Center for InternationallJusiness Education and
Research, Purdue University, Krannert School of Management, West Lafayette, IN 47907.
(Phone: 317/494-4463 or FAX: 317/494-9658)

PURDUE CIBER - 1995 WORKING PAPERS

No. 95-001

Timothy B. Folta
"Sovereignty Conditions and Governance Modes: An Option Theory Approach."

No. 95-002

John A. Carlson, Dong-Geun Han
"Monetary Coordination, Fixed Exchange Rates and Noisy Markets."

No. 95-003

Jon D. Haveman
"Can Barriers to Trade Make a Differential?"

No. 95-004

Kent D. Miller and Jeffrey J. Reuer
"Asymmetric Corporate Exposures to Foreign Exchange Rates."

No. 95-005

Gerald J. Lynch and Bradley T. Ewing
"Money Growth Variability and the Term Structure of Interest Rates in Japan. '.'

No. 95·006

Nicholas C. Petruzzi and Maqbool Dada
"Inventory and Pricing in Global Operations: Learning from Observed Demand."

No. 95-007

Kala Krishna and Marie Thursby
"Whither Flat Panel Displays?"

If you would like to request copies oj'specific papers, please contact the Center for International Business Education and
Research, Purdue University, Krannert School ofManagement, West Lafayette, IN 47907.
(Phone: 3/7/494-4463 or FAX: 3/7/494-9658)

~

Table 1
Commercial FPD Sales
Total Value (in Billions)
By Technology
Non-Emissive (LCD)
AMLCD
Other
Emissive
Plasma
Electrolwninescent
Other
By Application
Computer
Consumer
Business
Industrial
Transportation

1993
$6.5

2000*
$20

%

%

87
29
58

89
55
34

4
1
8

4

2
5

61
12
9

67
14

12
6

8

,J

6

*Projections
Sources: DoD 1994, Figures 2-1, 2-7, 3-1, 3-2; Stanford Resources

~

Table 2
1993 Market Shares by Country
(Percent)
LCD AJ.VfLCD Plasma Electroluminescent
Japan

92

98

68

47

U.S.

1

1

19

50

Other

7

1

13

3

~

Sources: DoD 1994, Figures 4-1, 4-2 and Table 4-1; Stanford Resources
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Table 3
Cost Regressions
.Dependent
Total
Independent
Variable Cost

ojy

47.12
(7.03)
554.13
(29.09)
,93
45

I
q
I

R'=

I

Observations

II
Total
Fi.."<:ed Cost
51.82
(.21)

!
!

j
I

I

,99
45

Standard Errors in Parenthesis
Data: Mently, D. E. and J. A. Castellano 1994.
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Figure 7. Capacity paths to the steady state in the
asymmetric case with yaO=.4 and ybO=.5.
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Figure 9. Net effects of $1 subsidies for the symmetric
case with yaO=.5 and ybO=.5.
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